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GHZ correlation provides secure Anonymous Veto Protocol
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Anonymous Veto (AV) and Dining cryptographers (DC) are two basic primitives for the crypto-
graphic problems where the main aim is to hide the identity of the senders of the messages. These
can be achieved by classical methods where the security is based either on computational hardness
or on shared private keys. In this regard, we present a secure quantum protocol for both DC and
AV by exploiting the GHZ correlations. We first solve a generalized version of the DC problem with
the help of multiparty GHZ state. This allow us to provide a secure quantum protocol for the AV.
Securities for both the protocols rely on some novel and fundamental features of GHZ correlations
related to quantum nonlocality.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Ac, 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Mn, 03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION
In the classical world, where any physical transmis-
sion can be traced to its origin, it seems impossible to
setup a secure way for message transmission without re-
vealing its senders’ identity. Dining cryptographers (DC)
problem [1] introduced by Chaum is one of the primary
attempts in this context. In a DC problem, three cryp-
tographers are curious to find out whether their agency
NSA (U.S. National Security Agency) or one of them
pays for the dinner. At the same time they respect each
other’s right to make an anonymous payment. A general-
ized version of the DC problem called DC-net where one
of the member from an agency publicizes a secret message
without revealing his identity [1]. An unconditionally se-
cure DC-net requires pairwise shared (secure) keys and
an authenticated broadcast channel. Since, the security
of DC-net relies on the generation of secure key between
pairs of members so it is not unconditionally secure1 if
members are not allowed to pre-share bilateral private
keys. Another major flaw of DC problem is that, it is
vulnerable against multiple payments. It shows zero pay
i.e. no transmission of message if even number (0, 2, . . .)
of members pay for the dinner and detects payment if
an odd (1, 3, . . .) number of members pay for the dinner.
There is another loophole in DC problems called collu-
sion loophole where some of the participants may coop-
erate among them to trace the person who pays. There
are some works that partially resolve the problem with
multiple payments and the collusion problem but none of
them provides an unconditionally secured solution [2–4].
Another variant of DC problem known as Anonymous
Veto (AV) problem [5]. Here a group of jury members,
who need to take an unanimous decision, but at the same
time want their individual decisions to remain secret i.e.
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1 security based on computational hardness of same nature as clas-
sical key distribution protocol.
without ever disclosing the identity of possible vetoing
member(s). This could be very important in many as-
pects of human societies. Security of the classical solution
of this problem is also based either on the computational
hardness like other classical cryptographic protocols or
on imposing restrictions on the number of dishonest play-
ers [6]. In this context, Boykin [7] provided a quantum
protocol to send classical information anonymously by
distributing pairwise shared EPR pairs2 among players.
In 2005, Christandl and Wehner [8] proved that the pro-
tocol presented by Boykin is not perfectly secure since it
does not satisfy the traceless property and they provided
an alternative quantum scheme of the DC-type problem
with the traceless feature. In this regard, we present se-
cure quantum protocol for both DC and AV problems
with the help of multi-qubit GHZ correlation and GHZ
paradox [9].
We start with a brief description of the GHZ paradox,
which will allow us to present a quantum protocol for
the three-party DC problem with a detection of multiple
payments. This three party DC protocol is quite simi-
lar to the protocol presented in [8]. We then extend the
protocol into n-party DC problem without any detection
of multiple payments. By exploiting this generalized ver-
sion of DC problem we demonstrate a quantum protocol
for the AV problem.
II. GHZ PARADOX
In 1989, Greenberger, Horne and Zeilinger (GHZ) [9]
provided a way to show a direct contradiction of quantum
mechanics with local realism without using any statistical
inequality. Consider a three qubit maximally entangled3
|Ψ〉 = | 000〉 − | 111〉√
2
(1)
2 two-qubit maximally entangled state 1√
2
[| 00〉 − | 11〉]
3 this entanglement is maximal in the sense that it gives the max-
imum violation of Bell’s inequality for a given set of observables
2known as GHZ states. This GHZ state satisfies the fol-
lowing four constraints
σx ⊗ σx ⊗ σx|Ψ〉 = (−1)|Ψ〉
σx ⊗ σy ⊗ σy|Ψ〉 = (+1)|Ψ〉
σy ⊗ σx ⊗ σy|Ψ〉 = (+1)|Ψ〉
σy ⊗ σy ⊗ σx|Ψ〉 = (+1)|Ψ〉,
(2)
where, σx, σy, σz are the Pauli matrices. Then, one can
easily show that the above four constraints cannot be
satisfied simultaneously by any local-realistic (LR) the-
ory [9, 10]. Similarly, for another three-qubit GHZ state
|Ψ⊥〉 = | 000〉+ | 111〉√
2
(3)
we have,
σx ⊗ σx ⊗ σx|Ψ⊥〉 = (+1)|Ψ⊥〉
σx ⊗ σy ⊗ σy|Ψ⊥〉 = (−1)|Ψ⊥〉
σy ⊗ σx ⊗ σy|Ψ⊥〉 = (−1)|Ψ⊥〉
σy ⊗ σy ⊗ σx|Ψ⊥〉 = (−1)|Ψ⊥〉.
(4)
Like the previous case, the above four constraints also
cannot be satisfied simultaneously by any LR theory.
III. QUANTUM DINING CRYPTOGRAPHERS
(QDC) PROTOCOL
Imagine that three cryptographers Alice, Bob and
Charlie want to play the Dining Cryptographers (DC)
problem. To do that they first share a number (say
L1) of copies of the GHZ state |Ψ〉 given in (1), one
qubit each from each copy. Here a copy of the states
corresponds to a run of the protocol. Onward we use
both the notations copy of the state or run of the protocol
synonymously. After receiving all the qubits from L1
copies of GHZ states they randomly select some runs
(say L2) and check whether the selected states satisfy
the GHZ paradox or not. If yes, rest of the shared
states (say, L = L1 r L2) are genuine copies of GHZ
state (1). The detail of the genuineness check of GHZ
state is discussed discussed later. After confirmation of
genuineness of the states the protocol goes as follows:
Protocol: QDC(3)
S1. Each member performs σz on his qubits if he wants
to pay for the dinner otherwise does nothing.
S2. Randomly select a copy of the states to distinguish
between the cases (i) even and (ii) odd no. of payment(s).
S3. Distinguish ‘no pay’ vs. ‘double pay’ in case (i)
and ‘single pay’ vs. ‘triple pay’ in case (ii).
S1: Performing local unitary operation to encode pay-
ment: Alice performs local unitary operation σz
on each of her qubits from L if she wishes to pay
the dinner. Otherwise, she does nothing. Bob and
Charlie follow the same.
(i): If an even number (i.e. zero/two) of members
pay the bill (i.e., apply σz) then the states
of all the members of L2 remain in the same
GHZ state (1) as
I⊗ I⊗ I|Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉; I⊗ σz ⊗ σz |Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉;
σz ⊗ I⊗ σz |Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉; σz ⊗ σz ⊗ I|Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉.
(ii): If an odd number (i.e. one/three) of mem-
bers want to pay for the dinner, the states are
transformed to |Ψ⊥〉 given in (3) as
σz ⊗ I⊗ I|Ψ〉 = |Ψ⊥〉; I⊗ σz ⊗ I|Ψ〉 = |Ψ⊥〉;
I⊗ I⊗ σz |Ψ〉 = |Ψ⊥〉; σz ⊗ σz ⊗ σz |Ψ〉 = |Ψ⊥〉.
In the next step of the protocol members distin-
guish between two cases (i) and (ii) without dis-
closing payer(s) identity.
S2: Distinguishing case (i) and case (ii): To distinguish
case (i) and case (ii), members randomly select one
of the run (say r1-th) from L. Now the task is to
identify the state (|Ψ〉 or |Ψ⊥〉) corresponding to
the run r1. Thus, the distinguishability task be-
tween case (i) and case (ii) reduces to the problem
of distinguishability of two orthogonal three-qubit
GHZ states |Ψ〉 and |Ψ⊥〉 [11].
Now the task is to distinguish between subcases
‘zero pay’ vs. ‘double pay’ for case (i) and ‘single
pay’ vs. ‘triple pay’ for case (ii).
S3: Distinguishing between subcases: Members randomly
selects one of the run (say r2-th) from L r {r1}.
If case (i) occurs in the previous step then each
member measures σy on his qubit if (s)he pays for
the dinner otherwise measures σx. If the product
of the local measurements is −1 then no member
has paid for the dinner (i.e., zero pay) and if the
product is +1 then two members have paid for the
dinner (i.e., double pay). The first case follows from
the top equation of (2) whereas, the second case
follows from the last three equations of (2). If zero
pay occurs NSA will pay for the dinner and if double
pay occurs the payment will be cancelled.
In case (ii), each member measures σx on his qubit
if (s)he pays for the dinner otherwise, measures σy.
If the product of the local measurements is +1 then
all the three members have paid for the dinner (i.e.,
triple pay) and if the product is −1 then only one
member has paid for the dinned (i.e., single pay).
The first case follows from the first equation of (4)
whereas, the second case follows from the last three
equations of (4). If a single pay occurs payment will
be accepted otherwise payment will be cancelled.
Obviously, two copy of the states, one copy for each step,
are sufficient. Therefore, it is enough if the list L con-
tains just two runs. This is true only if all the mem-
bers honestly follow the entire protocol i.e., perform local
3measurements (consistently) whenever asked according
to their action and declare the true outcomes for each
such measurement. If they act dishonestly, they do it
solely to trace payer(s) identity only, and not to create
any confusion regarding payment. The member who an-
nounces his results last in both the steps S2 and S3 enjoys
some advantage. (S)He may change the case by just send-
ing a flipped result of her/his measurement outcome. To
deal with this problem, members choose more than one
run in both steps S2 and S3 and the ordering of the an-
nouncement of the result is made random for each such
selected run in both steps. Therefore, no members gets
the advantage of being last to announce and if someone
still flips the result, that will lead to an inconsistent con-
clusion and subsequently, they abort the protocol and
starts a new one with a fresh set of resources.
A. Security analysis of QDC protocol
Since the payer(s) information in step S1 encoded in-
side the phase of the GHZ state and due to the party
symmetry of the state no quantum operation can reveal
the identity of the payer(s). So the local operations for
distinguishing the cases never disclose any information
about the payer(s) identity. Step S2 only disclose the
information whether the total number of payers are odd
or even. This information in no way harm the purpose,
rather it helps to detect multiple payments. In step S3
members only reveal their individual measurement re-
sult and not the choice of measurement to identify the
‘no pay’ in case of (i) and a ‘single pay’ in case of (ii).
By knowing measurement result one cannot predict the
measurement choice as that would immediately imply a
violation of causality principle. If two of the members co-
operate to each other then they can certainly predict the
measurement choice and hence the action of the third
party by knowing the measurement result. But this is
quite obvious, since the anonymity exists only among a
set of possible performers, and if the set is singleton, its
member is always traceable i.e., no protocol can keep the
singleton members set untraceable. In our QDC protocol
if the payment accepted i.e. a ‘single pay’ happens then
no non-payer have any information about the payer. But,
in case of rejection of payment the identity of payers may
be disclosed in two cases (i) if the ‘double payment’ occurs
then the non-payer knows that the other two members
are the payers. This can be avoided if we assume that
payment is made by one member only like the original
DC problem and then the protocol will end at step S2.
Based on the assumption that multiple payments will
never occur, one can easily generalize our QDC protocol
for n(≥ 3) number of members.
B. Generalized QDC protocol
Let a group of n cryptographers are sitting for dinner
at a restaurant and they want to find out whether their
agency NSA or one of them pays for the dinner, while
respecting each other’s right to make a payment anony-
mously. To implement the protocol n-cryptographers
share a copy of the generalized n-qubit GHZ state
|Ψn〉 = 1√
2
[| 000 . . .0〉 − | 111 . . .1〉] . (5)
The above GHZ state has the following correlation:
σt¯z |Ψn〉 =
1√
2
[| 000 . . .0〉 − (−1)t| 111 . . .1〉]
=
1√
2
[| 000 . . .0〉 − | 111 . . .1〉] = |Ψn〉
(if t is even),
=
1√
2
[| 000 . . .0〉+ | 111 . . .1〉] = |Ψ⊥n 〉
(if t is odd), (6)
where σt¯z denotes that in t-number of places σz acts and
in rest of the places 2 × 2 identity matrices I acts. For
the generalized DC problem with no multiple payments
t = 0, 1. Same kind of protocol with step S1 and S2
as described above will work in this case. By exploiting
this generalized QDC protocol we now provide a secure
quantum protocol for the AV problem for odd number of
parties. Then we extend the result for even number of
parties.
IV. QUANTUM ANONYMOUS VETO (QAV)
PROTOCOL
Imagine a jury with n members, who need to take an
unanimous decision, but at the same time want their in-
dividual decisions to remain secret. The generalized GHZ
state |Ψn〉 given in (5) would allow them to achieve this.
The quantum AV protocol starts with sharing L (L ≥ 2)
genuine4 copies of |Ψn〉 between jury members. Each
member gets one qubit from each of the copy of |Ψn〉.
4 To check the genuineness of states they randomly select some
copies of them and run the GHZ-type paradox as described in
section V.
4Protocol: QAV (odd-n)
S1’. Each member performs σz on his qubits if he
wants to vote ‘against’ otherwise, does
nothing.
S2’. Performs σx on qubit associated to a selected
run to distinguish between the cases
(i) even (including zero) and (ii) odd no. of
‘against’ votes.
S3’. For case (i), distinguish between the cases of
(a) unanimity ‘in favor’ and (b) an even
(excluding zero) no. of ‘against’ votes.
S1’: After receiving all the qubits, each member per-
forms the unitary operation σz if he is ‘against’ the
decision and does nothing if he is ‘in favor’. (i) If
an even number of members (including zero) vote
‘against’ the decision, all the states remain same
as |Ψn〉. (ii) Otherwise, all the states transform to
|Ψ⊥n 〉.
S2’: Jury members randomly select one copy of the state
to distinguish between the cases (i) and (ii) by dis-
tinguishing two orthogonal states [11]. Unanimity
in favor of the decision happens only if no mem-
bers (i.e. zero members) voted against. Since, (ii)
represents the case where at least one of the mem-
bers voted against so it does not require any farther
analysis. But, case (i) represents (a) the unanimity
‘in favor’ of the decision and (b) an even number
(2, 4, . . .) of members voted against the decision.
S3’: To distinguish between subcases (a) and (b) they
first randomly select one copy of the state and
each member performs (again) the unitary oper-
ation σz(1) =
(
1 0
0 cos pi
2
+ i sin pi
2
)
on his qubit
if he is ‘against’ the decision, otherwise does noth-
ing. (i) If the number (including zero) of members
against the decision is even multiple of 2 (i.e., mul-
tiple of 22) then the selected state will remain in
|Ψn〉. (ii) Otherwise, (i.e., the number of members
against the decision is odd multiple of 2) it will
transform to |Ψ⊥n 〉.
After distinguishing between these two cases, fur-
ther analysis has to be made for case (i) in S3.
Case (i) represents (1a) the unanimity in favor
of the decision and (1b) multiple of 22 (i.e.,
4, 8, 12, 16, 20, . . .) no. of members voted against
the decision.
To distinguish between subcases (1a) and (1b),
they again select another copy and each party
perform the following unitary operation σz(2) =(
1 0
0 cos pi
22
+ i sin pi
22
)
on his respective qubit if he
is ‘against’ the decision, otherwise does nothing. If
an even multiple of 22 no. (i.e., multiple of 23) of
members (including zero) are against the decision
the copy remains unchanged. Otherwise, (i.e., an
odd multiple of 22 no. of members excluding zero
are against the decision) the copy transforms to
|Ψ⊥n 〉. Again these two cases can be distinguished
by distinguishing the two orthogonal states.
Jury members keep repeating these steps. In gen-
eral, to distinguish the case of even multiple of 2t
no. of members (including zero) favouring the de-
cision and the odd multiple of 2t no. of members
against the decision, the required unitary operation
will be σz(t) =
(
1 0
0 cos pi
2t
+ i sin pi
2t
)
. Since, the
total number of jury members are finite so after
a finite number of steps they can detect whether
there is any unanimity ‘in favor’ of the decision.
Note that in the entire protocol the identity of the
member giving veto(es) is not revealed. The thing
that is revealed is the information regarding the
number of vetoes. Here also the security is guaran-
teed from the genuineness of the GHZ states.
If the number of jury members n(> 2) is even then mem-
bers share copies of |Ψn+1〉 where one (say, first) of the
jury members holds two qubits from each copy. Here, ex-
cept the first jury member all the other members follow
the similar protocol as described in case of odd no. of
members. In each run, the first member treats the first
qubit (from the pair of qubits he received at each run)
as earlier i.e., performs operation/measurement accord-
ing to his choice of decision and on the second qubit he
always performs the operations according to decision ‘in
favor’. Obviously, this arrangement does not provide any
advantage to the first member and hence does not effect
the objectivity of the protocol.
V. GENUINENESS CHECK OF GHZ STATE
Security of all the protocols described above is
solemnly dependent on the genuineness of the corre-
sponding GHZ state. Since, one can construct a se-
cure even (n − 1)-parties QAV(QDC) protocol from an
odd n-parties QAV(QDC) protocol so here we describe
only the genuineness check of GHZ states for odd n. To
check the genuineness of n(odd)-qubit GHZ state each
player j(j = 1, 2, · · · , n) randomly selects some runs
Rj (i.e. copies of the shared n-qubit GHZ state) and
for each r ∈ Rj he again randomly chooses a operator
Ojr ∈ {Oi}ni=0, where
O0 = σ1x ⊗ · · · ⊗ σi−1x ⊗ σix ⊗ σi+1x ⊗ σi+1x ⊗ · · · ⊗ σnx and
Oi = σ1x ⊗ · · · ⊗ σi−1x ⊗ σiy ⊗ σi+1y ⊗ σi+1x ⊗ · · · ⊗ σnx ,
for i = 1, 2, · · · , n with the convention n + 1 ≡ 1. The
upper indices on Pauli matrices represent the identity of
5the party. Now player j asks player t(t = 1, 2, · · · , n)
to measure his qubit (associated with the run r) in the
basis that present in the t-th place of the operator Ojr
and send the measurement outcome. Player j collects
all the local measurement data (including his won mea-
surement result) corresponding to the operator Ojr and
checks whether the product of the local measurement re-
sults is equal to the eigenvalue λjr of the eigenvalue equa-
tion
Ojr |Ψn〉 = λjr |Ψn〉, (7)
where λjr = −1 if Ojr = O0 otherwise, λjr = +1. The
above relations provide a GHZ like contradiction with
LR-theory for an n-qubit system when n is odd. By em-
ploying relations given in (7), one can construct the fol-
lowing LR inequality for n-(odd) two level system.
O =
∣∣∣∣∣
〈
n∑
i=1
Oi −O0
〉∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ (n− 1). (8)
The two extreme eigenvalues of the operator
(
∑n
i=1Oi −O0) are ±(n + 1) and the corresponding
eigenstates are |Ψn〉 and |Ψ⊥n 〉 respectively. Therefore,
only for |Ψn〉 and |Ψ⊥n 〉, the maximum algebraic value
of O i.e., O is equal to n + 1, and hence violets the
inequality (8) maximally. Thus, for odd n the relations
given in (7) uniquely determines the correlation of |Ψn〉.
Therefore, if the product of the local measurement
results associated to the observable Ojr is equal to the
eigenvalue λjr then the correlation is a genuine n-qubit
GHZ correlation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we present secure quantum protocols for
both the Dining Cryptographers (DC) problem and the
Anonymous Veto (AV) problem. The security of these
protocols are based on GHZ paradox and the properties
of the GHZ correlation. In our DC protocol, multiple
payments can be detected whereas no classical protocol
has this luxury with an unconditional security proof. We
then generalize the DC problem for n members based
on the assumption that no multiple payments would oc-
cur. By exploiting this generalized DC problem we have
shown that the multi-qubit GHZ state allow us to find a
simple solution for the Anonymous Veto problem.
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